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Abstract Using the example of architecture, this article defends the thesis that design-
ing should not be regarded as a kind of experimenting. This is in contrast to a
widespread methodological claim that design processes are equivalent to experimenta-
tion processes. The contrary thesis can be proven by focusing on actual practices,
techniques and design strategies. Closely connected with the thesis is an even more
important epistemological claim, which contends that designing serves not only to
develop artefacts but is also a means of acquiring genuine knowledge. When the
epistemic relevance of said practices, techniques and strategies is reassessed, designing
emerges clearly as an independent epistemic praxis. To defend the thesis, the present
article draws on and analyses empirical material from an ethnographic field study in
order to back up the conceptual analysis.
Keywords Designing . Experimenting . Knowledge . Epistemic strategies .
Epistemology of designing . Architecture
1 Introduction
That designing is a kind of experimenting is a claim often heard in the domain of
design, and it is one maintained by practitioners and theorists alike. This article
considers the question of whether designing is experimenting without, however,
addressing the popular metaphorical usage that highlights innovative or utopian
Philos. Technol.
DOI 10.1007/s13347-017-0256-4
* Sabine Ammon
ammon@tu-berlin.de
1 Institut für Berufliche Bildung und Arbeitslehre, Technische Universität Berlin, Marchstraße 23,
10587 Berlin, Germany
2 Institut für Philosophie, Technische Universität Darmstadt, Residenzschloss, 64283 Darmstadt,
Germany
approaches. Rather, it takes the claim literally in its methodological sense. A paradig-
matic version of this approach is set out in the highly influential book The Reflective
Practitioner by Donald Schön (1983), which revolves around the core thesis that
designing—as Breflection-in-action^—relies on experimenting. For the discussion of
design methods in their relation to methods in science, this stance offers a powerful and
alluring fall-back position. If it can be successfully shown that methods used to design
something are used equally for the purpose of experimenting, then this would bestow
upon the domain of design the status of a scientific endeavour; it would prove that
designing is a research activity much like those found in the natural sciences. More than
this, though, this methodological claim entails an even more important epistemological
one. If designing turns out to be a powerful research activity, then it must also be a
means of knowledge acquisition and, hence, a domain of genuine knowledge as
opposed to mere applied knowledge. It is no surprise that this issue is attracting so
much attention these days. With the modification of tertiary-level curricula due to the
Bologna process and the increasing pressure on academics to demonstrate research
activity, disciplines characterized by designerly or artistic ways of working struggle to
find academic justification and recognition for their approaches.1
My claim in this article is a different one, however. I argue that it is wrong, for
methodological, ontological and epistemological reasons, to equate designing with
experimenting. Indeed, it is not only wrong but also highly misleading to do so, as it
weakens the legitimate epistemic claims of design. To highlight parallels between
designing and experimenting is to obscure the genuine epistemic practices and strate-
gies of knowledge acquisition involved in processes of designing. Here again, scientific
methods are routinely instrumentalized as a benchmark in order to dismiss activities
with other characteristics and approaches as inferior. Only if these differences are taken
seriously, though (so my line of reasoning), can we start to recognize designing as an
independent epistemic praxis. The rather uncommon notion of praxis serves here as an
all-embracing term to incorporate habitualized practices as well as non-habitualized
actions and to integrate techniques, procedures, methods and strategies into the research
perspective. Analysing their epistemic relevance can explain the specific conditions of
processes of learning, gaining insight and striving for epistemic progress in a particular
field. Thus, by adopting a perspective that sheds light on the actual genesis of artefacts
rather than just results, it becomes possible to find out whether the epistemic claim of
the design domain is supported by observational evidence and whether the methodo-
logical analogy between designing and experimenting is in fact misplaced.
This latter thesis requires some clarification. I am not claiming that no experiments
take place at all (they certainly do) in the field of design with its disciplines that include
engineering sciences, architecture and design; nor am I arguing that design cannot also
play a significant role in the natural sciences (it undoubtedly can). Rather, my approach
is a heuristic one: it seeks to clarify basic concepts and provide a conceptual demar-
cation. By contending that it is possible to single out a specific epistemic praxis that
should be called Bdesigning^ and should not—for methodological, ontological and
epistemological reasons—be confused with experimenting, my aim is to provide a
basis for comparison that may help us to appreciate better the Bsciences of the
1 Examples of recent debates on the relations between experiment, art, design and architecture can be found in
Moravánszky and Kirchengast (2011), Schwarte (2011), Schwab (2014) and Buurman and Rölli (2016).
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artificial^, as Herbert Simon (1969) put it, in relation to the realm of the natural
sciences. The fact that we can find occurrences of both praxes in different disci-
plines—albeit to different extents—indicates some interesting interrelations and inter-
sections between these fields.
However, a philosophical investigation of processes of designing necessarily faces a
methodological challenge. Given that this article seeks to contribute to an empirical
turn in the philosophy of technology (see Kroes and Meijers 2000)—by providing well-
grounded philosophical reflections on empirical material—an important question to be
answered is: where are suitable and reliable sources to be found? As a praxis, designing
is ephemeral. It involves experts interacting with specific procedures, techniques and
tools. Although we find physical manifestations of (interim) results—such as sketches,
drawings, descriptions, working models and prototypes—most of them will not be
archived but ultimately thrown away as by-products of an ongoing process: they
gradually lose their value as the design evolves further. Therefore, any approach that
works with retrospective or historical case studies (as are prevalent in the philosophy of
science) is confronted with serious problems because most of the material needed to
analyse the case thoroughly no longer exists. As a consequence, historical analysis
generally struggles with meagre sources when it comes to manifestations of processes,
making it an even more speculative undertaking to draw conclusions about actual
practices from these findings. In contrast, detailed descriptions of methods and proce-
dures are found in the literature of design methodology. The advantage of such standard
literature is that it is usually written by people working in the field and is based on
studies by Binsiders^. However, another problem lurks here too. This body of literature
is not primarily descriptive but rather has prescriptive intent (see, e.g. Ehrlenspiel 2009,
Lindemann 2009, Müller 1990, Pahl et al. 2007). It seeks to improve existing design
processes by introducing specific methods, idealized procedures and a standardization
of design phases. Hence, given that engineers, architects and designers are often
reported to be very reluctant to adopt the proposed methods, little can be said about
how close these descriptions are to actual design processes.2
Yet in the last decade, an alternative has emerged. In a new body of literature, we
find an increasing number of studies analysing actual design processes using ethno-
graphic methods. These studies have emerged from cultural anthropology, micro-
sociology, science and technology studies and linguistics and aim to give an inside
view of design methods and practices. They continue and refine the path set out by
Schön in The Reflective Practitioner—a book which can also be seen as an early work
that uses ethnographic methods to achieve a better understanding of the praxis of
designing. Therefore, my investigation also indirectly addresses the question of wheth-
er ethnographic investigation can serve as an empirical basis for further developing a
philosophy of design and, if so, how it can shed light on whether or not designing is a
kind of experimenting. I do so by discussing a case study conducted by Albena Yaneva
in which she presents a detailed analysis of an architectural design project. This study
draws crucially on actor-network theory (ANT), which was initially used to investigate
scientists and their habitual practices in the laboratory by ethnographic means, in order
to work out the material basis of such disciplines (see, e.g. Latour and Woolgar 1979,
2 See, e.g. Müller (1990, p. 1); Cross (2006, p. 96). A detailed discussion of descriptive and prescriptive
aspects in John Gero’s approach can be found in an analysis by Pieter Vermaas and Kees Dorst (2007).
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Lynch 1985, Knorr-Cetina 1981, 1999). This approach has recently been extended to
the engineering sciences, architecture and design. In this way, methods originally
developed to study peoples and cultures have now been transferred to document and
decipher processes of creation.
In order to resolve the issue of whether designing is a kind of experimenting, the
field of architecture can be regarded as a paradigm case. This is not only because, as
Schön puts it, architecture is Bperhaps the oldest recognized design profession and, as
such, functions as prototype for design in other professions^ (Schön 1983, p. 77). It is
also because it offers some methodological advantages compared to other areas of
design when it is a matter of finding out more about actual design techniques,
procedures and practices. The size of project teams in architecture is moderate and
therefore easier to keep track of—even considering the external experts who participate
in them—than many large projects in engineering. Compared to single person projects,
however, it demands specific structures of communication which make the design
processes more accessible to outside observers. In addition, the working processes
are less based on the division and specialization of labour than in engineering, thus
making it possible to maintain a focus on the overall design process. Furthermore,
elaborate forms of notation and specific tools for reflection have evolved in the field of
architecture to enhance the creative process, resulting in tangible manifestations of this
very design process. A disadvantage could be the duration of a project, which can last
several years. This poses a problem for studies aimed at considering the development of
a project as a whole. However, since only certain design practices need to be analysed
to elucidate the main question addressed by this article, project duration need not hinder
us here. For these reasons, then, the analysis and discussion of design processes in
architecture can offer valuable insights and can complement existing investigations in
the philosophy of design.3
2 Designing: a Kind of Experimenting?
An influential account of designing as experimenting, as mentioned in Section 1, can be
found in Schön’s The Reflective Practitioner. Schön characterizes designing Bas a
conversation with the materials of a situation^ (Schön 1983, p. 78) which B[i]n a good
process of design […] is reflective^ (ibid, p. 79). The designer is making a move in the
design process that causes changes. By this, the situation Btalks back^ (ibid.), provok-
ing a response by the designer to the situation’s back-talk. Schön calls this reaction
reflection-in-action: BIn answer to the situation’s back-talk, the designer reflects-in-
action on the construction of the problem, the strategies of action, or the model of the
phenomena, which have been implicit in his moves^ (ibid, p. 79). In the course of the
design process, the designer is Bspinning out a web of moves, consequences, implica-
tions, appreciations, and further moves^ (ibid, p. 94). Schön addresses each move as a
local experiment when, for example, variations of a certain geometrical shape are tried
out. In their turn, local experiments are embedded in a global experiment of Breframing
3 So far, existing investigations in the philosophy of design have focused primarily on specific areas of
engineering. A rare example, which includes both engineering and architecture, is Vermaas et al. (2008); see
also Banse et al. (2006), Kornwachs (2007, 2010).
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the problem^ (ibid) which sets the direction for the inquiry. Both of these are a
reflective conversation with the situation (ibid, p. 94f.)—a shared Bgeneric process^
(ibid, p. 78) that underlies the various design cultures in architecture.4
What reasons does Schön give for designating the individual design move and the
comprehensive reframing of the problem as an experiment? In a nutshell, he claims that
changes prompted by a design move are often unintended and unexpected. Part of
Schön’s answer is anchored in his notion of the design situation. For Schön, designing
is a complex process which he explains as follows: BThere are more variables—kinds
of possible moves, norms, and interrelationships of these—than can be represented in a
finite model^ (ibid, p. 79). Although this description could be questioned—for it does
not differentiate between variables and parameters on the one hand and combinations
and interrelations on the other, all of which need not be infinite—it confirms a common
characterization of designing as being an elusive form of problem-solving: BThe
situation is complex and uncertain, and there is a problem in finding the problem^
(ibid, p. 129). In the literature of design research, the latter issue is also addressed as the
co-evolution of design and solution (see, e.g. Maher 2000); the former relates to the
famous characterization by Horst Rittel and Melvin Webber of design problems as
Bwicked problems^, Bwhereas science has developed to deal with ‘tame’ problems^
(Rittel and Webber 1973, p. 155).
Schön investigates the design process from a praxis perspective; he is interested in
the effects of this complexity not at the level of a system’s analysis but at the level of
concrete design practices. From this point of view, Bthe practice problem is a unique
case^ (Schön 1983, p. 129). The individual design moves are unpredictable and result
in surprising outcomes for the designer who has to interpret and evaluate the findings.5
As a consequence, sometimes moves are Bresisted^ when, for example, a set of design
stipulations does not work; sometimes moves engender Bnew phenomena^, when, for
example, unforeseen spatial potentials are discovered in a constellation (ibid, p. 94).
These findings from the local experiment call for Bnew appreciations^ (ibid) and guide
the subsequent moves in the design process. If the Bwhole idea^ (ibid, p. 95) is
questioned and, for example, a new approach needs to be found in order to reconcile
the shape of the building with the affordances of the site, then according to Schön a
global experiment is taking place. In order to find a new solution, the existing problem
must be reframed by developing a new overall idea, whose implications must also be
scrutinized.
When discussing whether designing is a kind experimenting, it is important to make
a differentiation between a broad and a narrow sense of experiment. Nowadays, a broad
sense of experiment, one closely related to the Latin notion of experimentum as attempt,
test or trial, is quite common. In this context, it is used to indicate activities that have an
4 However, Schön’s interest in The Reflective Practitioner goes beyond architecture. BReflection-in-action^,
according to his theory, is intrinsic not only to the design disciplines but to professional practices in general, be
it town planning, engineering, psychotherapy or management, all of which he investigates in separate case
studies.
5 It is important to note here that there are significant differences between a beginner or learner and a trained
professional. The latter Bzeroes in immediately on fundamental schemes and decisions which quickly acquire
the status of commitments. He compresses and perhaps masks the process by which designers learn from
iterations of moves which lead them to reappreciate, reinvent, and redraw. […] He does not need to play out all
of the trees of moves which might follow from his initial reframing of the problem^ (Schön 1983, p. 104).
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open-ended outcome or to describe inquiring into something that might be innovative
or more risky than usual. Understood in this way, it would be hard to deny that
designing is equivalent to experimenting—and indeed because of its broadness, this
understanding is of no help in clarifying the putative epistemic difference between the
two praxes. So what is emphasized here instead is the narrow notion of experiment as a
method elaborated within science, one of the B[p]rocedures for attaining scientific
knowledge^ (Hatfield 1998). Usually, experimenting as a Brule-governed scientific
method^ (Röseberg 1990, p. 977, translated by the author) is differentiated from that
of formulating theories and from observation and pure measurement. By means of
active experimental interventions, dependencies and interrelations can be explored with
the help of common standards of measurement and calibrated measuring devices. With
the introduction of the experiment, scientific effort is no longer confined to pure
descriptions of nature but rather opens up to the discovery of general laws that describe
the structure of conditions and allow prediction and manipulation (cf. Hatfield 1998,
Röseberg 1990, pp. 977 ff.). This leads to a characterization of the experiment in
methodological, ontological and epistemological terms, as pointed out by Wenceslao
Gonzalez (2007, p. 278): the experiment is a repeatable process associated with
Breproducibility and replicability^; it is related to the idea of Botherness^, and it stands
for the production of Breliable^ knowledge Bthrough a non-immediate process^.
With his notions of local and global experiment, Schön is addressing not just the
broad notion of experiment; his claim is more far-reaching. For him, the praxis of
designing also meets the demands of the narrow notion of experiment; the same Brigour
in on-the-spot experiment^ (Schön 1983, p. 133, comp. 145) found in scientific
research can be found in design. In order to substantiate his claim, he heuristically
differentiates between three kinds of experiment found in both design and science.
Exploratory experiments are actions performed in order to see what happens, without
being embedded in predictions or expectations. BExploratory experiment is the probing,
playful activity by which we get a feel for things. It succeeds when it leads to the
discovery of something there^ (ibid, p. 145). Move testing experiments are actions
performed in order to achieve an intended change. BAny deliberate action undertaken
with an end in mind is, in this sense, an experiment^ (ibid, p. 146). In its simplest
structure, the initiating move is affirmed if the outcome corresponds to the intended
consequences; if it does not, the move is negated. However, as moves often also
produce unintended effects, Schön proposes a more general reading: BDo you like
what you get from the action, taking its consequences as a whole? If you do, then the
move is affirmed. If you do not, it is negated^ (ibid). Hypothesis testing experiments are
actions aimed at discriminating among competing hypotheses found implicitly in the
pattern of the moves. BIf, for a given hypothesis, its predicted consequences fit what is
observed, and the predictions derived from alternative hypotheses conflict with obser-
vation, then we can say that the first hypothesis has been confirmed and the others,
disconfirmed^ (ibid, p. 146). The hypotheses are discriminated Bwithin the limits of the
constraining features of the practice context […]—taking as disconfirmation of a
hypothesis the failure to get the consequences predicted from it^ (ibid, p. 147).
According to Schön, it is specific to the context of design that experiments performed
by the practitioner in his reflection-in-action are exploratory, move testing and hypoth-
esis testing experiments all at the same time—in contrast to scientists who distinguish
between these different kinds of experiment (ibid, p. 147).
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On the surface, Schön’s claim is backed by studies in the history and the philosophy
of science on the praxis of experimenting. 6 With regard to epistemological and
methodological questions, many statements sound familiar when looking at methods,
epistemic practices and strategies of knowledge acquisition in processes of designing.
Without being able to follow this line of investigation here in detail, a few examples
may serve to give an idea of this. For example, Margaret Morrison (1998) highlights
Bvalidating procedures^ and Bconstraints for evaluating results^ and investigates Bthe
credibility of particular instruments^ within their operativity; Timothy Lenoir charac-
terizes experimenting as explorations of alternatives with an open ending (Lenoir 1992,
p. 186, referencing Frederic L. Holmes) just as Schön points to practices of exploration
within designing (see, e.g. Schön 1983, pp. 153, 156, 166); Hans-Jörg Rheinberger
emphasizes the importance of iterations in processes of experimenting as well as the
adeptness of the experimenter (Rheinberger 2005, pp 58 ff.)—this is echoed in Schön’s
formulations that stress the Biterations of moves^ (Schön 1983, p. 104) and the
Bvirtuosity^ (ibid.) of the designer’s performance.
When actual praxis is investigated, we find that a number of striking parallels exist
between designing and experimenting, such as rigorous inquiry, iterative exploration,
unintended and unexpected results, a progressive honing of questions and a gradual
approach towards solutions. But do these findings prove that designing is indeed a kind
of experimenting? No. It was John Dewey who long ago pointed out that when the
praxis becomes epistemically relevant, we are confronted with similarities—regardless
of whether we are talking about the natural sciences, engineering or medicine. He
pointed out that Bthere is no way in which the procedures used by the competent
engineer or physician in solving problems of determination of singular cases logically
differ from the procedures used by another group of men in establishing
generalizations^ (Dewey 1938, p. 438). The parallels indicated by Schön describe the
creative, active and craftsman-like elements that constitute processes of searching and
probing, trying and testing in the search for insight. Variations of these kinds of
exploration can be found in any epistemic praxis regardless of whether we calculate,
interpret, argue, experiment or design. Hence, what Schön describes as Bexploratory
experiments^ are nothing other than the exploratory nature of activities found in
epistemic praxes in general. The same goes for Schön’s broad definition of Bmove
testing experiments^, which frames any purposeful probing as experimenting. Given
this, Schön’s study provides strong arguments for defending the thesis that designing is
indeed an epistemic praxis, a bundle of practices, tools and techniques that enable
genuine knowledge to be generated. What is not yet demonstrated, though, is that the two
epistemic praxes of designing and experimenting belong to the same category—if one
wants to hold the much stronger thesis that designing is indeed a kind of experimenting.
However, a decisive answer can only be found by looking close-up at design practices and
analysing them in terms of epistemology and methodology. Schön’s investigation
6 Since the 1980s, it is the movement of experimentalism within the history and philosophy of science that has
drawn attention to the actual praxis of the experiment. As Theodore Arabatzis points out, it Breflects a
promising shift from an exclusive philosophical preoccupation with the end products of scientific activity to a
systematic investigation of that activity itself. This shift has led to a novel view of science. Science, on this
view, is not simply a changing body of knowledge, codified in textbooks and research papers, but an evolving
array of practices^ (Arabatzis 2008, p. 168). For further examples, see also the case studies in Hans Radder
(2003).
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concentrates only on the teaching situation, which has the advantage that the actors
explicate in their conversation many otherwise implicit design moves; the disadvantage
of this, however, is that it documents the learning process of a ‘novice’ rather than
professional design practices. In what follows, therefore, I propose to shift the empirical
basis. To discuss and illustrate the thesis of this article, I examine a case study that offers a
meticulous account of an actual project as it develops in an architectural bureau.
3 Considering Scale: Albena Yaneva’s Case Study at OMA
B[T]o understand what the designers do when they conceive a building^ (Yaneva 2005,
p. 868)—this is the aim of a study by Albena Yaneva that I wish to discuss more
thoroughly in the following pages.7 The study, influenced by actor-network theory and
especially by the work of Bruno Latour, is one of a number of recent studies on
architectural practices in the field of science and technology studies (STS) and has shed
light especially on the relevance of scaling. Yaneva Blives^ (ibid), as she calls it in an
allusion to ethnographic field work, in the Office for Metropolitan Architecture (OMA)
or, more precisely, in the unit of a project team responsible for the extension of the
Whitney Museum of American Art in New York. The company, co-founded by Rem
Koolhaas in 1979, is one of the most renowned architectural bureaus in the world,
having developed many acclaimed projects such as Casa da Música in Porto, the
embassy of the Netherlands in Berlin and CCTV Headquarters in Beijing.
When OMAwas commissioned to design the extension of the Whitney Museum of
American Art, the building already had a long history (Yaneva 2009, pp. 8–20, 203–
204). Shortly after its completion in 1966, the building, designed by Marcel Breuer and
Hamilton Smith (Fig. 1), was bursting at the seams. In 1979, Derek Walker Associates
and Foster Associates were called upon to find a solution to enlarge the existing
building, followed by Michael Graves who, between 1981 and 1989, developed three
controversial variations that remained unbuilt. After a hiatus, OMA tried between 2001
and 2004 to convince the clients to develop a novel approach (Figs. 2 and 3). To
anticipate the outcome: this suggestion too was rejected due to the high costs it would
involve. Shortly after this, Renzo Piano was chosen to solve the problem; the new
building finally opened at a different location in 2015.
Conceiving a museum involves bringing together and harmonizing a whole host of
different requirements. Generally, the building should act as an urban landmark; the
rooms need to be suitable for displaying artworks; the arrangement of the rooms needs
to ensure that visitors are guided through the exhibition; and lighting, statics, building
physics and the constraints of fire prevention laws all have a considerable impact on the
design. 8 The clichéd design process proceeds from preliminary, rough, small-scale
considerations to fully developed, large-scale details. In practice, however, many
overlaps take place. Yaneva observes, for example, that there is a discussion about
the cubature of the building in relation to the surrounding area and about the specific
7 In the following, I draw on the description provided in Yaneva (2005). Where necessary, this description is
supplemented with information found in Yaneva (2009). A detailed discussion of Yaneva’s approach within
the context of actor-network theory has been published in Ammon (2012).
8 This is just a fraction of the requirements; see also Yaneva (2005, p. 872).
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usage of the space going on at the same time. As a result, the design proceeds by
working simultaneously on models in different scales (Fig. 4). For Yaneva, this shifting
of scales turns out to be a core technique for developing the building, Ba building that is
made knowable and real as scales are shifted^ (Yaneva 2005, p. 868). She concludes:
Fig. 1 Home of the Whitney Museum of American Art, designed by Marcel Breuer and Hamilton Smith,
from 1966 to 2014.© Gryffindor 2010, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Whitney_Museum_of_
American_Art.JPG, accessed 15 August 2016
Fig. 2 Collage showing the extension of Whitney Museum of Modern Art in New York in a street
perspective. © OMA
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BThrough such practices, a building can be conceived in thought and brought into
existence^ (ibid, p. 869).
Pivotal to the core issue addressed in this article is that Yaneva, without making it
explicit, refers back to the classification by Schön and interprets scaling in design
processes as an experimental situation: B[I]t is subjected to constant and well-equipped
observation of possible consequences of acting on scale models; it is an apparatus for
conducting, recording and interpreting the results of manipulating selected features of
models^ (ibid, p. 868). These design experiments are characterized by the fact that the
architects either scale up or down in order to scrutinize the consequences of these
actions. Yaneva identifies two kinds of experiments: the exploratory move that involves
Bprobing in trial-and-error fashion^ (ibid) and the systematic test that B[aims] for an
intended outcome to be confirmed or disconfirmed. These tests aim at probing param-
eters and realities connected to the building’s particular mission^ (ibid, p. 868f.).
However, neither of these candidates can count as a classification of experiments.
Exploration, as we have seen earlier, is not a distinctive feature of experimenting but
rather a common feature of any epistemic praxis. Testing, which is prevalent in the
engineering sciences, is structurally different from experimenting and cannot count as a
Fig. 3 Model of the Whitney Museum extension. © OMA
Fig. 4 A collection of working models at different scales. © Albena Yaneva
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kind of experimenting (Kornwachs 2012, pp. 123–128). Testing is intrinsically linked
to prototyping or scale modelling in order to scrutinize a specific scenario. From the
point of view of a logical reconstruction (a stance which Kornwachs takes), we find a
deductive-nomological inference in the case of the experiment and a practical syllogism
in the case of the test. Or, to put it more bluntly: we are dealing with laws when we
experiment, and we are dealing with rules when we test. In contrast to an experiment, a
test does not explore whether a certain effect can be subsumed under a law but rather
explores whether a rule is effective. Hence, tests with scale models in architecture are
not instances of experimenting. Again, as with Schön, the theoretical framework and
the resulting interpretation provided by the author do not support the claim of designing
being experimenting.9
Still, even if Yaneva’s theoretical analysis does not hold in this respect, it could be
the case that the practices of scaling she describes actually are instances of
experimenting. Let us therefore follow Yaneva in a detailed description of a typical
instance of scaling. At a certain stage of the design, the position of an escalator causes
major problems and has to be moved. Kunlé, an architect, rearranges the escalator in
the large spatial model which shows not only the building infrastructure but also art
works and visitors (Fig. 5). Unsure with the outcome, he asks his fellow team members
whether they like the proposal. They encourage him to Bscope^ the new arrangement.
Kunlé now turns to the smaller model with a tiny paper escalator and rigorously
investigates the space enclosed by walls made of cardboard. One observation tool used
in this scaling practice—a Bmodelscope^—has an important function: it is a specific
kind of endoscope that makes it possible to get a visual impression of the interior of the
model; thanks to this tool, even small-scale models can convey an inside view of a
building (Fig. 6). In order to explore the effect of possible positions, the modelscope is
used by the design team to check the new placement. The individually performed
investigations are commented on and evaluated in the group; a joint search for new
ideas and changes takes place (Fig. 7). With this analysis at hand, the group returns to
the large model in order to perform a number of modifications. The models, being at
the core of the scaling practice, trigger discussions and, with their help, the design is
reworked and developed further. They serve as Bimportant tools for shared cognition^
(ibid, p. 872), as Yaneva describes it: B[A]rchitects think of the building by modelling,
by cutting foam and paper and using various scoping techniques. It is not a free
intuitive creation of a building shape generated ‘out of the blue’^ (ibid, p. 872).
For Yaneva, the larger scales do have Ba larger scope, with greater cognitive and
representational power^ (ibid, p. 882) due to Btheir distinct capacity to capture hetero-
geneous actors in a model^ (ibid, p. 881). B[T]he large scale model is more powerful,
not because of an inherent superiority of size, but because it has the ability to capture
more parameters and concerns, to sum up more requirements and limitations, to reflect
9 A different view was put forward by the sociologist Trevor Pinch (1993) who argued that testing is the
common ground in experimenting and in designing technology. However, although testing—which is used to
examine in depth a specific stage of the project by considering certain questions—can be part of an
experimental setup as well as of a design setup, this does not strengthen the argument that experimenting
and designing are structurally the same. Pinch’s argument merely indicates that a more precise heuristic
differentiation is needed between the epistemic praxes of experimenting, testing and designing; this would
make it possible to judge better to what extent the elements of one praxis enter another and how their mutual
relations unfold.
Why Designing is Not Experimenting
more details, corners and finishing, to enrol more viewers, to enable more bodies to
gather around it, to mobilize the public awareness better, to provoke more violent
disputes or to trigger more unpredictable actions^ (ibid). Small and large models stand
for Babstract^ versus Bconcrete^ or Binquiry and speculation^ versus Bpractical
concerns^ (ibid, p. 885). Therefore, the small- and the large-scale models correspond,
according to Yaneva, to the states of Bknowing less^ and Bknowing more^ (ibid, p.
881). The knowledge in question is a Bknowledge about shapes, dispositions, locations;
again, this is not knowledge of facts, but rather knowledge about spatial transitions, not
‘knowing that’, but ‘knowing where’^ (ibid, p. 885). In their working, both small- and
large-scale models interact in a Bcircuit^ (ibid, p. 886): B[W]hen the small model is no
longer needed because its job has been completed, it is scaled up and transformed into a
large one; when the large model accomplishes its function, it is necessary to return to
the small one^ (ibid). The scaling procedures refine the building and render it Bmore
and more visible, more present, more material, real^ (ibid, p. 887). Recurring processes
of sizing up and down continue until a stabilization is achieved.10
Despite Yaneva’s neglect of the role of paper-based work in relation to model
building (giving rise to a one-sided view of scaling tools and techniques), her examples
convincingly show that knowledge about what is being designed is gradually acquired
within the process, and she is right to claim that this sort of knowledge cannot be
adequately grasped solely by Bknowing that^. However, her epistemological interpre-
tation of the findings appears to be over-simplified from a philosophical point of view.
To address this knowledge as Bknowing where^ is not satisfying, since design knowl-
edge comprises much more than just spatial relations; also, simply coupling the states
of Bknowing more^ or Bknowing less^ to scale is incorrect, as scale relates to different
sets of problems. It is therefore time to turn away from Yaneva’s account and to ask the
general question of whether ethnographical investigations are suitable for a more
philosophically precise description of design processes in architecture. Yaneva calls
her approach an Bethnographical observation^ (Yaneva 2005, p. 888, footnote 1).
Correspondingly, we find in the methods and sources employed throughout the
Fig. 5 Scale model exploring the interior space. © Albena Yaneva
10 See also (ibid, p. 883, 887f.); in exceptional cases, greater shifts in scale also take place (see ibid., pp. 882 f.).
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investigation some basic elements of field research, including participant observation.
In anthropology, participant observation enables the researcher to be involved in day-
to-day activities over a long period of time; it allows her to work with the language of
the field and to study anything that happens in its quotidian context (see Salzmann
Fig. 7 Team discussion of the findings supported by the model. © Albena Yaneva
Fig. 6 Examining the model using a modelscope. © Albena Yaneva
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2010). Adopting this stance, Yaneva occupies a place at the project team’s table. By
doing so, she acquires an inside view of the processes and is able to follow technical
discussions, operations and presentations, habits and rites; she takes notes, photographs
and sound recordings. These observations are supplemented by in-depth interviews
with the people involved in the projects, by archival studies, and by a training in the
field that consisted of Blearning specific architectural terms, of mastering the design
vocabulary and trying to cope with the realities of the office in the same way [… as the
architects] did^ (Yaneva 2009, p. 35). In the end, as Yaneva puts it, she Bbegan, up to a
certain point, to think and act like an architect^ (ibid).11
A number of fundamental constraints associated with ethnographic approaches to
design processes in architecture are conspicuous here. For one thing, the period of
investigation is usually short compared to the entire design process: design (including
planning) processes can last for many years, especially when big and complex projects
are in question, such as that of developing a museum. Ethnographic studies often rely
on 6 months of field research accompanied by intensive periods of preparation and
post-processing before and after the field stay.12 As a consequence, only specific stages
of the design process are analysed. Yaneva starts her field research when early variants
of the design are already worked out and a larger project team has already been put
together; she conducts her observations at the conceptual design stage (2009, p. 10,
footnote 12). At this stage, however, a significant number of the decisions central to the
design have already been taken on two levels at least: in a preparatory dialogue with the
clients in order to outline and articulate in more detail their intentions for the project, in
a thorough examination of the site and by compiling variations of preliminary design
and at a bureaucratic or administrative level by outlining planning restrictions. After the
planning approval stage, the permit set evolves into the construction plans, which turn
into the construction process where changes in the design still take place. Usually, at the
beginning of a larger project, only a few people are involved. The team is augmented
by a range of external experts linked to the project when the planning process begins.
As a consequence, the communication structure and working materials change through-
out the different stages of the design process; conversation, sketches, scale models,
drawings, descriptions and images can have different functions depending on the stage
in which they are introduced or occur. This becomes apparent only when the whole
process of designing (including planning and constructing) is considered—something
which would require an observation period of several years.13
Another constraint is that, in Yaneva’s case, only one architectural bureau—and
within the bureau, only one team—is subjected to field research, as the data collec-
tion is very time-consuming. However, the praxis of designing has many different
schools and traditions: quite apart from the question of style, many design cultures
exist and are manifested, for example, in their preferences for computers or pencil
11 For a description of the sources, see Yaneva (2009, pp. 23–35) and Yaneva (2005, p. 869).
12 This time span can be found, for example, in Murphy (2004, 2005) and Ewenstein andWhyte (2007, 2009);
Ignacio Farías even uses a much shorter time span of one and a half months (2013, p. 84). However, Yaneva’s
period of investigation is longer; she returns over a period of 2 years to the office whenever new developments
in the project take place (Yaneva 2005, p. 888, Yaneva 2009, p. 34).
13 For an insight into professional everyday practice, see, e.g. Cuff (1992) and Grubbauer and Steets (2014).
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and sketchpad, for modelling or drawing, for modes of collaboration and communi-
cation and so on. This is not only a personal choice: methods and techniques also
depend on education and training, on the degree of routine and on the demands and
complexity of the task at hand.
One might assume that this leads to a problem when generalizing the study’s
findings. Whether or not the constraints mentioned above will actually turn into a
problem, however, depends on the nature of the conclusions we want to draw from
a set of ethnographical observations. For example, statements about the design
process as a whole based on findings derived within a limited period of time
would be questionable. This is quite apart from the fact that only one stage of the
design process is focused on during the observation period and that the stages of a
design process can differ significantly with regard to the factors influencing them,
the working procedures adopted and the composition of the design team. Similar-
ly, it would be questionable to claim that the design culture observed within this
one design team is typical of all other design processes. However, the intended
impact of Yaneva’s study is a different one. Her aim is to single out scaling, a
technique easily overlooked, as an important element in the advancement of
design processes and their related modes of knowledge acquisition. That scaling
is indeed an important technique is confirmed by a range of design curricula,
textbooks and professional guidelines. By embedding her study in the state of the
art of the research literature, she renders plausible the notion that her investigation
does not involve outlier practices and deviations or exceptional circumstances and
that her findings are not a mere product of her research method. Hence, her
assertion that scaling is an important and general knowledge practice in architec-
ture is indeed well grounded.14
Nevertheless, the question remains to what extent a study like Yaneva’s can
contribute to a philosophical analysis on the epistemology of designing. It is the
deployment of Banthropology’s commitment to depth and thick description^
(Candea 2010, p. 486) in those ethnographical investigations that enables valuable
access to the praxis perspective, with its insights into methods, techniques and
practices. Such insights could not be gained in the studio situation involving a
student and an instructor or in psychological experiments in the laboratory or
through mere quantitative inquiry. Findings of this kind can be used as telling
examples to empirically ground a general line of argument regarding the nature
and epistemology of designing. In this way, ethnographic fieldwork offers a rich
repository of actual instances of design which help to paint a more Brealistic^
picture. Hence, in the following I will use the scaling techniques described by
Yaneva as a touchstone for investigating the philosophical claim that designing is
a kind of experimenting.
14 An apparent asymmetry in reasoning can also be used to expose common design myths such as the napkin
sketch, in which a design is created in a single intuitive moment, on the basis of a ready-made image formed in
the mind. The scaling procedure becomes a telling example that reveals this design myth by falsification (see
Popper [1935] 1994, p. 7); the underlying structure of reasoning is the modus tollens. However, generalizing
on the basis of a single outcome is considered a fallacy, and inductive inferences require stronger
corroborations.
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4 Methodological, Ontological and Epistemological Differences
In order to explore the relationship of designing and experimenting in more detail, let
us return to the characterization put forward by Gonzalez. He defines the practice of
experimenting according to seven aspects, three of which matter for the present
discussion (Gonzalez 2007, p. 278): methodologically, Bexperiment is connected to a
process which should be repeatable and, therefore, it is commonly associated to the
reproducibility and replicability^; ontologically, Bexperiment is related to the idea of
otherness (i.e. something—real or not—which is used to test)^; and epistemologically,
Bexperiment is related to a kind of reliable knowledge acquired through a non-
immediate process.^15 Drawing on Yaneva’s observations about scaling, I seek to show
in the following that in all three aspects highlighted by Gonzalez there is indeed a
crucial difference between designing and experimenting.
Let us begin, first, with the methodological difference. According to Gonzalez,
experimenting is associated with repeatability. Its aim is to elicit the same results under
similar conditions; technical devices and tools serve as stabilizing factors to guarantee
this effect. In science, an important proof of the truth of empirical findings is the
confirmation of the results by a different research team. Successful reproducibility is
seen as a methodological virtue and a necessity; any malfunction relating to reproduc-
ibility and replicability is seen as a defect which needs to be either eliminated or
explained as an anomaly. In designing, the situation is entirely different. It would be
highly implausible for the same outcome to be achieved by a different team of
architects under similar conditions—any such outcome would immediately be classi-
fied as plagiarism. 16 The very different design proposals put forward by Michael
Graves, OMA and Renzo Piano for the Whitney Museum extension give an idea of
just how different architectural design outcomes can be (though in this case the
situation is more complicated, as the requirements changed throughout the process).
The peculiarity of designing becomes more obvious when we consider the diversity of
results in a studio crit or a competition based on the same design task. Superficially, we
might think that style and aesthetic preference are responsible for this effect; a suspicion
which, at first glance, seems to be confirmed in the case of large, prestigious projects in
which the creators seek to be recognizable in the product. However, the key reason for
this effect is rather that designs need to be tailored to a particular solution: they are
subject to specific constraints which have to do with complex framework conditions
such as costs, materials and intended use. The consequence is a blurred design
situation, countless potential parameters and a variety of possible optimal solutions,
all of which lead together to the vast variety of outcomes. The reasons for this can be
found in the open-endedness that characterizes the start of a design process; this is often
15 For the sake of completeness, the remaining aspects should be mentioned here as well: semantically,
Bexperiment originally has a sense and a reference that differs from ‘observation’^, logically, Bexperiment is a
structural ingredient of science which is different from ‘theory’ and, in principle, it is also distinct from
‘model’^, axiologically, Bthe experiments can be oriented through different values according to distinct aims
(i.e. experiments in basic science could be divers from experiments in applied science)^, ethically, Bthere is
concern on some kinds of experiments, mainly when they are related to certain human affairs (either to the
persons as individuals or to the society as a whole)^ (Gonzalez 2007, p. 278).
16 The detailed analysis of design and construction processes in the aviation industry by Walter Vincenti
(1990), which confirms the great variety of (potential) results, suggests that the situation in the engineering
sciences is rather similar.
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referred to as Bfuzziness^ (cf. Banse 2000, p. 66 f., translated by the author) or
Bwickedness^ (cf. Rittel and Webber 1973). There is a need to explicate the aims of
the design process within the design process itself, in a so-called co-evolution of design
and solution (e.g. Maher 2000). The construction of many working models at different
scales (Fig. 4) is precisely what supports this endeavour and leads to the harmonization
of often conflicting demands, aims and conditions. A dependency on fuzzy processes
of evaluating and weighting that incorporate particular preferences and values leads to
specific results—and hence to singular insights. General insights and generalizable
principles are to be found on another level and are often passed on as non-explicit
know-how. This explains the characteristic lack of repeatability in design, which
constitutes a methodological virtue; it must not be confused with the lack of repeat-
ability in science, which is reported as methodological failure.17
Second, there is an ontological difference. The project analysed by Yaneva shared
the fate of many endeavours in the design disciplines: after many years of intensive
planning by OMA, the project of extending the Whitney Museum of Modern Art on the
Upper East Side was called off. Designing is projective; it aims to develop future
procedures or artefacts. During the crucial phases of their evolution, the design seeks to
make manifest something which is non-existent and which might never exist, as in the
case of the OMA design. Herein lies a fundamental difference in contrast to
experimenting: Experimenting as a method used in the natural sciences (in its narrow
sense, described above) is geared towards real-world phenomena. In contrast to this,
designing has no such Bcounterpart^. As Gonzalez put it in his definition, there is no
Bidea of otherness^ (2007, p. 278) or pre-established design Bgoal^ during the decisive
phases of development. In ontological terms, designing explores the non-existent (or
not yet existing) world whereas experimenting explores the existing world.18
This ontological difference becomes clearer when it is reformulated in terms of
modes of reference. Figure 1 above shows a building on the Upper East Side in New
York which hosted the Whitney Museum of Modern Art from 1966 to 2014 and was
designed by Marcel Breuer and Hamilton Smith. As a photograph, it refers to (or
denotes) the building and is hence called a depiction. We get a similar result in terms of
reference when we turn to Fig. 2: the photograph documents the presentation model of
the Whitney Museum extension; it refers to the model and is hence a depiction.
17 This difference in methodological virtues explains why failures in repeatability, which happen again and
again, do not support the argument that experimenting and designing are methodologically the same. The
same goes for argumentation and persuasion: although some positions in the sociology of technology (e.g.
Latour and Woolgar 1979, Knorr-Cetina 1981, Collins 1985, Pinch 1986) have shown that these techniques
play a role in experimenting which should not be neglected, again, this does not support the claim that
experimenting and designing are methodologically the same. The same goes for the so-called experimenters’
regress, an argument developed by Harry Collins (1985, pp. 79–111). Collins contends that what is usually
taken by scientists as a good experimental result is obtained by a good (properly functioning) experimental
setup. At the same time, the goodness of an experimental setup is judged by the fact that it gives good
results—and hence, according to Collins, there are no formal criteria to decide whether the setup is working
properly. Even if Collins’ claim were justified (which is highly contested, see, e.g. Franklin and Perovic 2015),
the fundamental methodological difference remains due to the different methodological virtues.
18 As indicated by the philosopher of technology Hans Poser, this difference is an achievement of the modern
age and is shown in the opposing notions of discovering (German: ent-decken) and creating (German: ent-
werfen). The older Latin term invenire incorporates both meanings (Poser 2013, p. 137 f.). Interestingly,
positions based on strong constructivism obliterate this differentiation by exaggerating the creational and man-
made aspects.
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However, the situation differs fundamentally when we start to analyse the mode of
reference of the scale model itself. The model components in light and dark grey as
well as those rendered in brown show the new building complex including the
refurbishment of the Breuer Building and the brownstones. As a whole, the model
refers to Bnothing^—as the envisioned artefact does not exist.19 In his investigation of
the modes of reference of notations, Nelson Goodman called these occurrences Bnull
denotation^ (1968, p. 21 ff.). In terms of reference, then, we have an extraordinary
situation: during the crucial planning stages, all the design models (along with all the
sketches, drawings, plans, renderings, calculations and descriptions) refer—while they
are used as tools of reflection—to nothing. They are exclusively instances of null
denotation.20
In some cases, though by no means all, the design will ultimately be realized. Then,
a model or plan which has served up to that point as a design tool turns into an
instruction manual. Oliver Scholz explained this feature in the context of image theory
by highlighting the different intentions attached to depictions and Bdesign images^
(2009; 2012). According to Scholz, they vary in their Bdirection of fit^ (Scholz 2012, p.
48): in the case of the former, the image is made to fit the world, while in the case of the
latter, the world is made to fit the image. Hence, depictions can be described by a mind-
to-world directedness and Bdesign images^ by a world-to-mind directedness. However,
after the design has actually been built, a technical drawing or model can turn into a
depiction: at this point, it is documenting the produced artefact—just as the photograph
in figure one documents the Whitney Museum of Modern Art.
As a consequence, only in its very late phases does the design process enable an
iterative adaptation to real world phenomena—when the artefact is actually built.
However, during the major part of the process of designing, no actual realization of
that which is invented is available for adjustment or correction.21 In contrast to an
experimental situation where worldly phenomena are at our disposal as working
materials throughout the entire process, in the decisive phases of exploration in
designing the working materials are restricted exclusively to Bproxies^, which do not
represent in any literal sense. Designing is characterized by what we might call phase
displacement: in architecture, the reality check takes place afterwards, once the building
has been constructed and is in use. In contrast to experimenting, which relies on
empirical validation within the exploration process, the empirical validation in design-
ing only takes place when it comes to construction and usage—and thus after the
exploration process has been terminated and the basic design has been developed and
19 When the individual components of the model are analysed, the situation becomes more complex. The
white model components refer to the existing surroundings (and are therefore depictions), whereas all the other
components show a future scenario which includes a comprehensive conversion of the Breuer building and the
brownstones.
20 Design here shows interesting parallels to fiction—however, with an important difference to mere fiction as
found in literature or the visual arts. In successful processes of designing, null denotation is limited in time
because of the subsequent realization; becoming a Breal^ artefact is intended right from the beginning.
Exceptions are visionary and fantasy architecture which usually lack this intention. They nevertheless refer
to the general framework set by ordinary design.
21 This diagnosis holds true even if mock-ups are considered. Especially for major projects partial 1:1 mock-
ups (e.g. a façade model) became a quite familiar tool for examining specific problems (e.g. special
construction details or material selection, without embedding them in the related systems of heating and air-
conditioning).
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approved. Although the insights gained in the process of realization and usage do not
support the ongoing design process, they can nonetheless be of relevance for future
developments. This factor might explain why experience is of such crucial importance
in the design professions.
We now come, third, to the epistemological difference between designing and
experimenting. As was convincingly shown by Yaneva, and by Schön before her,
epistemic exploration takes place during the design process. It is through this process
that insights are approved and knowledge stabilized. This in turn ensures that, when it
comes to realization and usage, the design works and fits—in architecture as well as in
engineering. Whether or not the static system of a bridge will collapse due to certain
vibrations should not be left to be discovered during the construction phase; the ability
of a mobile phone to transfer voice signals despite high winds and loud background
noise must be guaranteed before manufacture; and it is crucial to find out prior to an
emergency whether the braking distance of a train remains constant even in different
operating conditions.
Yet if there are no worldly phenomena to explicate, how can we reasonably argue
that knowledge about the future artefact is acquired in the design process? Traditional
epistemology points to the concept of truth when it comes to explaining the nature of
knowledge. Experimenting is about discovering true findings which are backed up by
empirical facts and are, as Gonzalez writes, Bacquired through a non-immediate
process^ (2007, p. 278). However, as one of the core elements of any traditional
definition of knowledge, truth does not help in the case of designing. Even our ordinary
use of language marks the difference: whereas the statement that the law of gravity is
true is a classical scientific claim, the statement that a building (or a sewage system, a
gas turbine, or a car) is true would not be classified as a scientific claim but as ideology.
As an epistemic endeavour, designing does not seek to discover truth; instead, it strives
for rightness. If we want to describe outcomes that fit and work in an epistemic sense so
that they therefore constitute consolidated knowledge, we would say the building was
designed correctly, that is, it exhibits rightness. However, the notion of rightness does
not simply portray a result; rather, it shifts the focus onto the process of its origination:
the design process itself comes to the fore.
Rightness was introduced as an epistemological concept by Catherine Elgin and
Nelson Goodman (Goodman 1978; Goodman and Elgin 1988; Elgin 1996, 2006; cf.
Ammon 2009, 2016). Applied to the domain of architecture, it enables us to get a better
grasp on the epistemology of designing. In the context of a procedural epistemology,
Elgin and Goodman frame rightness as a dynamic process of equilibration which makes
it possible to describe epistemic gains and progress independently of Bexternal^ factors
of approval in the manner of a Bgod’s eye view .^ Little by little, in hard-won steps and
iterative loops, rightness is developed, options are checked countless times, revised,
discarded or improved until, eventually, reliable knowledge emerges in a stabilized
form which allows for the realization of the artefact. Many factors may have an impact
on ensuring this outcome. They may pose constraints, establish frameworks or simply
guide the direction of the ongoing process. To give some examples: When exploring
the design problem, selecting from among variations or assessing potential results,
several factors can be of major importance, such as the coherence of the design, its
conformity with well-established bodies of knowledge, the relevance of certain param-
eters, the anchoring of partial results in existing design experience, the range of the
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intended solution and the effects on the overall setting. To support the design process, it
is possible to fall back on approved and, in some cases, standardized knowledge
corpora which are fed into the ongoing process and are developed further by it. Some
of this knowledge is found in manuals, norms, regulations or laws (which are often
influenced by socio-political interests), and some elements derive from different disci-
plinary knowledge domains. Whether these factors play a role depends on the context
and the situation at hand. The effects and consequences of the overall structure need to
be considered when solving problems, favouring applications, eliminating anomalies,
making differentiations and establishing relations.
This specific epistemic constellation explains why proxy materials play such a
prominent role throughout the process of designing. These design artefacts—in
Schön’s words Bthe materials of a situation^ (Schön 1983, p. 78)—are the one and
only material resource at hand that enables the projected design, and hence the
design knowledge, to be probed and explored. There are sketches, drawings,
plans, perspectival renderings, diagrams, tables, different kinds of models,
numerical-based calculations and descriptions in verbal language—just to mention
the most striking ones (see, e.g. Elser and Cachola Schmal 2012, Ammon and
Capdevila Werning 2017). In their notational structure, they open up milieus of
reflection which help to develop the design further and to convey (partial) results;
in doing so, they serve as Bthinking^ tools and as media of communication.
Notations are certainly an important aid to thinking, reasoning and communicat-
ing—in many other epistemic praxes, experimenting included. However, it is the
aspect of exclusiveness which is so characteristic of the design disciplines. Due to
the ontological situation and the projective nature of design, only the notational
exploratory setup is able to provide answers; there is no outside authority that
might serve as a neutral judge. For an epistemology of designing, this presents
itself as a riddle: depending on the situation, the outcome seems to be fairly
arbitrary. Anything goes; the result depends, apparently, on the will of its creator.
The answer to this riddle lies in the techniques and methods which make it possible
to continually check the evolving design. Used in combination with particular tools and
design artefacts, these practices help designers to implement epistemic strategies, that
is, endeavours that actively pursue epistemic objectives and are an integral part of
epistemic praxes in general. This also allows us to reframe the practice of scaling,
which was presented by Yaneva—erroneously—as an experimental situation (see
above). Scaling is a specific technique that is used to implement and support epistemic
strategies in design processes, as shown in the following examples:
– Reducing complexity: This often goes hand in hand with parsing sub-issues and
identifying unresolved questions and is done by narrowing down missing infor-
mation and lacunae and filling gaps where possible. The reduction of complexity
can successfully be supported by scaling. Enlargement or sizing down enables us
to concentrate on certain aspects. For example, in building design, we often find
the scales 1:1000 and 1:500 used to focus on urban aspects, 1:200 and 1:100 for
answering questions regarding approval planning, 1:50 for execution planning and
1:20, 1:10 or 1:5 for construction details. If the change of scales is skilfully done—
as Yaneva describes in the case study—then it is possible to work on partial
problems and to clarify dependencies and interrelations.
Ammon S.
– Varying and comparing: This can take place at various stages of the design using
several techniques and media. It is often found in the individual process of
sketching, when tracing and copying techniques are used with transparent
sketching paper to explore the changes and their consequences on specific aspects.
It can also be found in an abundance of working models, as in Yaneva’s example.
Highlighting differences by means of comparison is often done in meetings by
juxtaposing different drawings or models (or both). Again, scale can support this
strategy: comparison is facilitated by working within a fixed scale.22
– Identifying relevant parameters: In the design process, scenarios are played
through and modified in order to get an overview of possible consequences which,
in turn, need to be critically evaluated. This requires the relevant parameters to be
identified and isolated before being tested, with the aim of revealing interrelations.
In this way, many factors that have a major impact on the design task in question
come into view. It is possible to explore the extent to which they are negotiable and
changeable and also to check out how they need to be weighted according to their
relevance in cases of conflict. A shifting of scales can support this search, as
described in the case of the escalator in Yaneva’s study. In particular, the small
scale indicates the effects of the escalator’s position for the building’s circulation
while the large scale gives an impression of the concrete spatial situation. By
analysing their interdependencies, the influencing parameters can be singled out.
– Assessing: The process of exploration described by Yaneva is closely related to the
development of assessment criteria for choosing appropriately from among vari-
ants. The criteria make it possible to give reasons for preferences and to set
priorities. In determining a suitable position for the escalator, criteria had to be
developed by the team to judge the different options available.23
– Externalizing and explicating: Designing relies very much on this strategy in order
to make moves that are often only implicitly comprehensible. This is usually done
with the help of notational techniques: an important element of plans is the scale
indicated in the legend, which leads to specific rules of depiction. Depending on
whether the plan’s scale is 1:500, 1:100 or 1:50, not only what is depicted differs
but also how it is depicted (Bielefeld 2014)—which in turn enables us to address
different questions.
– Searching for errors: Projecting techniques are helpful here as well as a mutual
matching process of elevations, sections and floor plans, as they enable a planner to
cross-check connections and interdependencies. The same goes for model-building
techniques: shifting the scale can enhance this process. Increasingly, the search for
errors is also supported by software: new building information modelling (BIM)
22 A vivid sketching example can be found in an investigation by Boris Ewenstein and Jennifer Whyte (2007,
p. 699, Fig. 2). That these procedures of variation and comparison can also be conducted verbally is shown by
the analysis of a design team meeting by Keith Murphy (2004). Grouped around a table covered by the current
floor plan of the envisioned object, the team starts to develop several variations for a possible solution
concerning a particular design problem. By intentionally bringing together differing standpoints based on
differing expertise and personal background, prior decisions are recapitulated, conflicting demands are worked
out and priorities are set. This can be done in a small team of three—as in the case study by Murphy—or in a
larger meeting including external experts, clients, authorities or the public: by deliberately encouraging
plurality and dissonance, it is possible to push forward the search for a solution.
23 A preliminary discussion of design criteria in architecture from a philosophical point of view is offered by
Pitt (2008).
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programs can implement an automated ‘clash detection’ (Borrmann et al. 2015,
pp. 272–277, 281–282, Eastmann et al. 2011, pp. 272–275).
Contrary to the impression one might get from Yaneva’s investigation, scaling is not
the only technique but one among a number of techniques and methods—each with
their particular usage of tools and media—to be found in processes of designing. Other
candidates include practices of sketching, drawing, projecting, modelling and calculat-
ing. Many of them are interrelated; usually, there is a variety at hand from which the
designer can choose to support the same process. Not only personal preferences but
also the demands of the project—geometrically complex forms, for example, will
require different methods than a design based on regular patterns—lead to differing
cultures of designing. The variety, however, also has epistemic reasons. On the one
hand, every milieu of reflection—with its specific forms of notation, techniques, media
and related epistemic strategies—provides an arena in which to address selected
features and aspects of a design. This explains why so many different techniques and
methods with their respective tools and materials are employed in the design process, as
they complement each other when addressing design problems in different ways.
However, they not only complement each other, they also make it possible to cross-
check the results. If similar results are acquired through different milieus of reflection,
the insights gained are strengthened and lead towards stabilized knowledge. In addition,
this diversity also explains why the design can neither be reduced to any specific
notational product or to the sum of all of them. The design artefacts always and only
convey specific features and aspects, and not all relevant features and aspects can be
conveyed by design artefacts in any case. Knowledge based on experience as well as
many non-notational forms of instruction are needed to successfully complete the
construction phase of a building.24
5 Conclusion
The case study by Yaneva vividly presents the technique of scaling as a valuable means
of knowledge generation and, hence, as a mode of genuine knowledge production. The
case of scaling shows how, in the design process, the search for insights and knowledge
is promoted by specific techniques, methods and strategies. These help to single out
problems, identify unresolved questions, supply procedures for tentative solutions as
well as to refine and check them until they convincingly withstand scrutiny. The shift in
scale exemplifies how unresolved aspects are approached in a multi-modal manner and
how tireless critical questioning and trying out of provisional outcomes takes place
24 A note needs to be added here. Characterizing the technique of scaling and the use of scale models as
important elements in the design process does not imply that they are employed exclusively in the design
process. Indeed, the opposite is the case. The technique of scaling might also become part of experimental or
testing situations, and scale models can occur both as Bmodels of the world^ and as Bmodels as step in design^
(Müller 2009, p. 642 ff., p. 646 ff.), that is, as design models and depicting models (Ammon 2017). Hence, the
mere occurrence of scaling techniques or of scale models is neither an indicator of the epistemic praxis of
designing nor does the use of scale models necessarily lead to the methodological, ontological and epistemo-
logical differences discussed above. Whether or not these differences actually occur can only be revealed by a
more comprehensive analysis of the epistemic praxis itself.
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until a stable result is achieved or an unsuccessful one abandoned. Scaling serves here
as a placeholder for the impressive variety of techniques, tools and materials. In close
interrelation, they enable processes of iteration and variation, of weighing and selection,
of searching and sounding out, thereby enabling, throughout, the careful development
and conscientious analysis of the future artefact.
The previous section has shown that the differences between designing and
experimenting run deep when methodological, ontological and epistemological issues
are taken into consideration. The analysis of these issues clearly leads us to assert that
designing is an independent and effective epistemic praxis as important as
experimenting, interpreting, reasoning or calculating. Moreover, due to the similarities
that exist within the broader design domain, one can assume that this finding applies
not just to the field of architecture but also to engineering design, as well as to any area
where artefacts are conceived. At this point, one might be tempted to ask to what extent
the analysis of a specific design technique such as scaling allows us to draw conclu-
sions regarding the epistemic praxis of designing in general. Whether we are consid-
ering sketching, drawing, projecting or modelling, the very same methodological,
ontological and epistemological issues arise as long as they serve as means to explore
that which as yet is non-existent. However, they differ in the range of questions they are
able to address and in their validation strategies. This is where future research needs to
begin. The exact role of differing milieus of reflection in these areas needs to be
determined; to do so, the empirical basis needs to be broadened. An interesting parallel
to simulation also arises here, where we have many instances of null denotation, as
described earlier. This might be a hint that, in some cases and in certain respects,
simulation-based exploration is closer to designing than to experimenting—a line of
thinking which provides a promising approach for engaging in the ongoing debate
about whether or not simulation is a kind of experimenting (e.g. Winsberg 2015,
Schiaffonati 2016 for simulation in engineering science).
So far, the present analysis has shown that designing is a genuine epistemic praxis
rather than a kind of experimenting. However, the analysis has not demonstrated
something which the thesis of designing as experimenting often also implies: it has
not shown that designing correlates to a scholarly method or even that it stands for
scientificity in general. Indeed, by characterizing designing as an epistemic praxis, the
question regarding its scientificity is not even posed. Although genuine knowledge
production in the design domain can reasonably be argued for, the path from designing
as an epistemic praxis to Bdesign science^—or the Bscience of design^—has not yet
been trodden.25 Results from design processes can certainly serve as a source and
primary material and, hence, can flow into further scholarly work on, for example,
meta-analyses, comparative structural investigations or the reworking of procedural
rules. In this way, results enter into systematized processes which engender knowledge
that goes beyond singular cases and which is usually not spelled out in the ordinary
design process. However, in order to transfer insights deriving from a design process
into a systematized explicit body of knowledge, a reflexive moment must come into
25 Nigel Cross (2006, p. 97 ff.) distinguishes between scientific design which Brefers to modern, industrialized
design based on scientific knowledge^, design science which Brefers to an explicitly organized, rational and
wholly systematic approach to design^ and science of design which Brefers to that body of work which
attempts to improve our understanding of design through ‘scientific’ (i.e. systematic, reliable) methods of
investigation^.
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play, a moment that methodically checks, evaluates and organizes underlying process-
es. This kind of design research already differs from the original activity of designing in
its critical distancing, systematization and generalization as well as in its practices of
transmission and dissemination of results, all of which are embedded in scientific work.
As soon as these aspects come into play, then the praxis in question is no longer the
epistemic praxis of designing but is part of a comprehensive science of design.
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